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Abstract. SRAM-based FPGAs are sensitive to radiation effects. Soft 
errors can appear and accumulate, potentially defeating mitigation 
strategies deployed at the Application Layer. Therefore, Configuration 
Memory scrubbing is required to improve radiation tolerance of such FP-
GAs in space applications. Virtex FPGAs allow runtime scrubbing by 
means of dynamic partial reconfiguration. Even with scrubbing, intra-
FPGA TMR systems are subjected to common-mode errors affecting 
more than one design domain. This is solved in inter-FPGA TMR sys-
tems at the expense of a higher cost, power and mass. In this context, 
a self-reference scrubber for device-level TMR system based on Xilinx 
Virtex FPGAs is presented. This scrubber allows for a fast SEU/MBU 
detection and correction by peer frame comparison without needing to 
access a golden configuration memory. 
Keywords: SRAM-based, FPGA, EDAC, SEU, MBU, SEFI, TMR, 
Scrubber, Scrubbing, Readback, Reconfiguration, Configuration Mem-
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1 Introduction 
When used in space applications, electronic devices are exposed to an ionizing 
radiation tha t is orders of magnitude higher than the one received at sea level. 
This affects the behaviour of semiconductors, inducing both a long term cumula-
tive degradation as well as instantaneous damage or Single Event Effects (SEE). 
SEE can be reversible (soft errors) or destructive (hard errors). 
Xilinx Virtex F P G A s are also sensitive to these effects. Tolerance to both long 
term degradation and destructive effects has been improved in Virtex-4QV and 
Virtex-5QV series by hardening the technology. For example in 4QV series, Total 
Ionization Dose (TID) of 300 krad(Si) and Single Event Latchup (SEL) immunity 
has been reported [1]. However, their SRAM-based Configuration Layer is still 
susceptible to several types of soft errors, namely Single Event Upsets (SEU), 
* This work has been funded by CICYT Project TEC2009-08589. 
Multiple Bit Upsets (MBU) and Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI). 4QV 
series characterization for SEU and SEFI has also been reported in [1], but an 
equivalent report for 5QV series has not been published yet. 
When high-energy particles hit the Virtex FPGAs, SEUs can appear either 
in Application Layer (memory elements driven by users application) or in the 
underlying Configuration Layer (logic and routing resources set by configuration 
SRAM). When in Application Layer, SEU effects can be persistent or transient 
depending on whether the affected logic has memory or is memoryless. When in 
Configuration Layer, SEUs can affect logic or routing resources, and their effects 
are persistent until a reconfiguration restores their initial state. A particular case 
are SEFIs affecting the configuration logic, which cannot be repaired without 
re-initializing the FPGA. 
A SEU in Configuration Layer may propagate as a functional failure in the 
Application Layer, independently of the user functionality implemented. Indeed 
a SEU in a routing resource may induce single or multiple errors in the Ap-
plication Layer. This situation is dramatic considering that about 90% of the 
configuration bits are linked to routing resources [2], and that configuration 
memory density keeps on growing in every new FPGA generation, thus increas-
ing the MBU cross-section [3]. Complementary SEU tolerance techniques have 
been incorporated to enable the use of SRAM-based FPGAs in harsh radia-
tion environments: Error Detection And Correction (EDAC, such as TMR and 
majority voting) at Application Layer, and memory scrubbing at Configuration 
Layer. The reliability improvement of TMR systems when scrubbing is applied 
has been deeply analyzed in [4]. 
In this paper we propose a simple scrubber architecture for an inter-FPGA 
TMR system. As opposed to techniques based on embedded Error Correction 
Codes (ECC) [5], multiple errors per frame can be detected and corrected. The 
faulty frame is fully restored by taking advange of the redundant configuration 
data. And, as opposed to previously reported systems, it does this without nom-
inally needing to access a golden configuration memory or a reference EDAC 
code memory [6]. The proposed scrubber also allows a fast SEFI detection by 
periodically monitoring the already known SEFI symptoms. Because radiation 
environment is variable, it allows dynamic scrub rate adjustment, thus reducing 
power consumption to the minimum necessary. Finally, the proposed scrubber 
concept is universal for Xilinx FPGAs from Virtex-4 on, only some control logic 
specificities need to be tailored for each FPGA series. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the scrubbing techniques 
for Xilinx Virtex FPGAs. Section 3 introduces the proposed self-reference scrub-
ber for a TMR system. Section 4 presents the simulation results for the proposed 
scrubber. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions of this paper and outlines 
the future work. 
2 Scrubbing Xilinx Virtex FPGAs 
Xilinx Virtex FPGAs can be dynamically reconfigured after the initial power-
on configuration practically an unlimited number of times. Dynamic global 
reconfiguration affects the whole programmable fabric, and application execu-
tion is interrupted. Dynamic partial reconfiguration only affects part of the fabric 
while the rest operates without interruption. The dynamic partial reconfigura-
bility is a unique feature of Xilinx Virtex FPGAs and can be exploited in dif-
ferent ways. In space applications it is particularly useful as it allows, on one 
hand, Configuration Memory scrubbing for SEU mitigation and, on the other, 
Application Layer in-flight reconfigurability [7]. 
2.1 Internal versus External Scrubbing 
Configuration Memory scrubbing is driven by a Configuration Manager (in-
formally known as scrubber), typically implemented in a radiation-hardened 
device external to the FPGA, either HW or SW driven. Scrubbers internal 
to the FPGA may also be implemented by using the Virtex primitives ICAP 
and FRAME_ECC [5],[8]. These primitives are theirselves implemented in the 
programmable fabric, so they are also susceptible to radiation. Although fault-
tolerant implementations of internal scrubbers have been proposed [9], external 
scrubbers are typically more reliable [10]. In this work, only external scrubbers 
will be considered. 
All Virtex FPGA configuration ports support external scrubbing. Among 
them, the 8-bit parallel SelectMAP (SMAP) interface is typically used as a 
good trade-off between speed and pinout penalty. For example, in Virtex-4QV 
series this interface can be clocked up to 80MHz. At this rate it is possible to 
fully configure the largest 4QV (XQR4VLX200) in about 70ms, excluding block 
RAM contents. 
2.2 Configuration Memory Structure 
For Virtex-4 and subsequent FPGA families, the minimum configurable element 
in the Configuration Memory is a frame, which is a set of 41 words of 32 bit each. 
The frames do not cover the whole programmable fabric height, but only the 
height of a memory row. Each FPGA has an specific number of rows that cover 
the whole fabric area. The rows are grouped in two halves, so called top and 
bottom. In addition, frames in each row are grouped into columns with variable 
sizes which depend on the column type. With such memory structure it is possible 
to define multiple bidimensional reconfigurable regions. The number of frames, 
rows, columns and column types are specific for each FPGA of the Virtex series. 
Fig. 1 depicts the generic Configuration Memory structure described above. 
In addition to the programmable fabric, the Virtex Configuration Layer also 
includes configuration control logic and associated registers for monitoring and 
control. Among these 32-bit registers, the Frame Address Register (FAR) allows 
addressing any individual frame. The FAR is composed of several fields, with 
different organization depending on the Virtex FPGA generation. The FAR re-
sets to the left-most frame of the top-row 0, and auto-increments right-up first. 
After the top right-most frame, the FAR goes back to the left-most frame of the 
bottom-row 0 and auto-increments right-down. 
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Fig. 1. Configuration Memory Sctructure for Xilinx FPGAs from Virtex-4 on 
2.3 Readback and Scrubbing Configuration Memory 
Two main strategies exist for SEU/MBU mitigation: open-loop and closed-loop 
scrubbing. Open-loop scrubbing (or blind scrubbing) consists on a preventive 
and cyclic SEU/MBU correction (i.e. without prior detection) through dynamic 
partial reconfiguration of the full Configuration Memory. The configuration data 
is retrieved from a golden data source, typically a radiation-hardened non-volatile 
memory, and written through the configuration port. As long as scrub rate is 
faster than the expected SEU rate, SEUs will not accumulate. An example of an 
open-loop scrubber for Virtex-4 is [11]. 
Closed-loop scrubbing instead is a two step process. First the configuration 
frames are cyclically read back for SEU/MBU detection. Only if an error is 
detected, the correction process is initiated. There are different possibilities for 
SEU/MBU detection and correction. The simplest one is the comparison of read-
back frames against their golden counterparts. In case they differ, the golden 
frame is used to scrub the faulty frame through the configuration port. Simi-
larly to the open-loop scrubbing, this solution implies the permanent availability 
of the golden configuration memory, with the corresponding power consumption. 
Another possibility, which is available in Virtex-5 FPGAs, is to check the CRC 
computed during the readback process by means of an embedded circuitry. In 
case error is detected, the frame Error-Correcting Code (ECC) bits are used to 
locate the error. Once located, the faulty frame is scrubbed with a corrected 
content through the configuration port. However in this last case, the process is 
relatively complex and only single errors per frame can be corrected. 
In Virtex FPGAs, Configuration Memory readback is done by reading frame 
32-bit words on a byte basis (in case of using 8-bit wide SMAP) from the Frame 
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Fig. 2. Inter-FPGA TMR System 
Data Register Output (FDRO). Likewise, scrubbing is done by writing frame 
32-bit words on a byte basis to Frame Data Register Input (FDRI). After a 
complete frame is read back or scrubbed, the FAR auto-increments as described 
in Section 2.2. This exempts the scrubber from continuously updating FAR be-
fore each access, thus reducing the processing overhead. 
3 Self-Reference Scrubber for In te r -FPGA T M R Systems 
3.1 Inter-FPGA TMR Systems 
Inter-FPGA TMR, or device-level TMR, implies the use of independent FPGAs 
for each of the three design domains. A diagram of such system is depicted in 
Fig. 2. A three-way external scrubber is represented, interfacing the three SMAP 
ports at the Configuration Layer. A three-way external voter is also represented, 
voting the three application data streams at the Application Layer. These two 
elements are critical and must be implemented in radiation-hardened devices, 
either jointly or separated. Strategies for inter-operation between both elements 
will be covered in a future work, but are out of the scope of this paper. 
This architecture is used for high reliability and availability systems where 
common-mode errors affecting more than one design domain must be avoided. In 
intra-FPGA TMR systems, and as highlighted in Section 1, this is more likely to 
happen as configuration memory densities increase [3]. In addition, inter-FPGA 
TMR is required for those applications that cannot afford a potential outage due 
to SEFI. 
3.2 Scrubber General Description 
In this work we propose a closed-loop scrubber for TMR systems, whose diagram 
is shown in Fig. 3. The scrubber is governed by the FSM, which in turn manages 
the Readback and Scrubbing Controllers. The SMAP interfaces handle the bidi-
rectional links with the FPGAs. The Frame Buffers are 41 words each, i.e. 1,312 
bits each. The SEFI Detection block is monitoring some specific FPGA pins and 
registers and asynchronously alerts the FSM in case SEFI is found. Finally, the 
Golden Configuration Memory is mainly used for power-on configuration and 
SEFI recovery. 
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Fig. 3. Self-Reference Scrubber Diagram 
FSM and Scrubber Operation. A simplified state diagram for the scrubber 
FSM is shown in Fig. 4. In a nominal operation, three identical configuration 
frames are read back from the FPGAs and stored in their corresponding Frame 
Buffers. At the same time, frame triplets are compared on a byte basis as they 
are read through SelectMAP interface in order to detect SEU/MBUs. At the 
end of each frame readback, a flag indicates if any mismatch was found in each 
particular domain. This implies that the faulty element at system level is the 
Frame In Error (FIE). If frames are found identical, readback resumes and new 
frames are read back. If one FIE flag is raised, the dirty frame is scrubbed with 
a correct frame from one of the other two Frame Buffers. After that, the FIE 
flag is cleared and the readback for the three FPGAs is resumed. 
There is one scenario in which SEU/MBU will go undetected due to a common-
mode error: when three particles hit each FPGA in exactly the same frame, the 
same bits within the frame, and within the same scrub cycle. If instead of three 
particles is two, the two dirty frame will be taken as good and the error will be 
propagated to the third one. However, the probability of such remote events is 
extremely low. The also remote possibility of having simultaneously three differ-
ent SEU/MBU location in the three frames under comparison can be recovered 
by scrubbing the three frames with data from the golden memory. Apart from 
this case and for power-on configuration and SEFI recovery, the golden memory 
can be almost permanently unpowered. 
In persistent FIE is found (i.e. the same frame address is found dirty 
in consecutive readbacks), the dirty FPGA is passivated and the sytem turns to 
DMR mode. In this mode, FIE detection is performed by comparing bytes from 
two domains. Again, if the frames are identical the readback resumes and new 
frames are read back. If they are not, the two frames are considered dirty and 
are scrubbed with data from the golden memory at the expense of higher power 
and slower operation. After that, readback for the two FPGAs is resumed. 
Fig. 4. Self-Reference Scrubber FSM States 
As highlighted in Section 1, one of the main advantages with respect to other 
embedded SEU/MBU correction techniques proposed, is that multiple errors in 
a single frame can be detected and corrected. This is because the full dirty frame 
is scrubbed regardless of how many bits in error it may have. 
Readback and Scrubbing Controllers. These blocks translate high level 
commands from the FSM into atomic commands for the SMAP Interfaces. In 
addition, the Readback Controller compares each byte triplet for the incoming 
readback frames. Scrub rate can be dynamically adjusted by FSM in order to 
adapt to the changing radiation conditions and to limit scrubber power con-
sumption. Previous publications state that scrub rate should be at least ten 
times the expected SEU rate [13],[14]. In any case, no more than one FIE should 
be detected across all three FPGAs within a single scrub cycle. Note that this 
does not guarantee that TMR protection at Application Layer is not defeated, 
as SEUs in routing resources may induce multiple errors. If more than one FIE 
is detected within a scrub cycle, or FIEs are detected in consecutive scrub cy-
cles at any given time, one should consider increasing the scrub rate. A shorter 
scrub cycle improves the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) figure [4]. Therefore, 
the trade-off between reliability and power consumption must be managed. 
SEFI Detection and Recovery. Concurrent SEFI detection is achieved by 
several means in accordance with [1] and [12]. Configuration pins are contin-
uously monitored for Power-On-Reset (POR) and SMAP SEFIs. Configuration 
control registers are cyclically polled to detect SEFI symptoms, such as abnormal 
values or flags indicating that the control logic has reached an invalid state. 
In case SEFI is detected while in TMR mode, the failing FPGA is fully recon-
figured from golden memory while the other two are still operating. No power-
cycle is needed, according to [12]. During this time, the readback controller seeks 
for mismatches between the two available frames (DMR mode). Once the failed 
FPGA is available again, its FAR is synchronized with the other two to resume 
readback in lockstep in TMR mode. In case of persistent FIE/SEFI on the same 
FPGA (i.e. present after consecutive reconfiguration cycles), the failing FPGA is 
passivated and the sytem turns to DMR mode. Finally, in case SEFI is detected 
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Fig. 5. Self-Reference Scrubber Simulation Timeline 
while in DMR mode, the failing FPGA is in turn fully reconfigured. During this 
time, FIE detection is suspended as it works in purely simplex mode. Once the 
failed FPGA is available again, the system returns to DMR mode. 
4 Simulation Results and Discussion 
A VHDL description for the system shown in Fig. 3 was simulated for the purpose 
of validating the self-reference scrubber concept. For the FPGAs a cycle-accurate 
simulation model from previous work was used [15]. The model represents func-
tionally the Configuration Layer of a XQR4VLX200 FPGA, implementing both 
the 39,120 configuration frames and the associated control logic. Such model 
allows for fault injection at random configuration bits of any of the three Con-
figuration Memories and at random instants within the scrub cycle. Some of the 
known SEFI effects have also been modelled. 
The simulation timeline for the basic readback-scrubbing operation in TMR 
mode is shown in Fig. 5. The frame readback time is tr and the frame scrub 
time is ts. The overhead time required to poll some of the configuration registers 
to detect SEFIs and to initalize some other registers before each scrub cycle is 
t0. An overhead time is also included in ts, as a single frame scrubbing also 
requires initialization of some control registers. The simulated SelectMAP clock 
frequency is 20MHz as an initial trade-off between reliability and power. 
The main scrubber simulated performance is summarized in Table 1. Besides 
Simulated Time, CPU Time for the full readback and configuration cycle simu-
lations, running on an processor at 3.2GHz, is shown for reference. 
CPU Time is more than reasonable taking into account that three Configura-
tion Memories with more than 51Mbit each are simulated, and that SelectMAP 
interface is simulated with clock cycle accuracy. The table shows that tr and ts 
are in the same order of magnitude, as they are mainly driven by the SelectMAP 
clock cycle. The main difference is due to the overhead time included in ts. If 
no FIE is found within a complete scan, the full readback cycle takes trj « 
t0 + (33,720 x tr), where 33,720 is the number of frames to be read back (af-
ter excluding the BRAM areas). If SEFI is found, the full reconfiguration cycle 
takes, for one or more FPGAs running concurrently, tsj « 33,720 x ts provided 
that the interface with the golden memory is at least as fast as the SelectMAP 
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Table 1. Self-Reference Scrubber Simulation Results 
Scrubber Performance 
Simulated Time 
C P U Time 
to 
8.0 /LIS 
-
tr 
8.2 /LIS 
-
ts 
12.1 /LIS 
-
tr,f 
276.5 ms 
49 s 
t*,f 
276.5 ms 
52 s 
Note: SelectMAP Clock Cycle = 50ns 
interface. The simulation results for trj and tsj confirm the validity of the sim-
ulation model for the purpose of evaluating the scrubber concept, and provides 
a bet ter insight of the scrubber performance. 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
A self-reference scrubber for in ter-FPGA T M R systems based on Xilinx Vir-
tex F P G A s has been presented in this paper. This scrubber allows for a fast 
SEU/MBU detection by peer frame comparison, and correction by scrubbing 
the dirty frame with one of the other two. Scrubbing relies on dynamic partial 
reconfiguration. SEFI can be detected by polling internal registers or F P G A pins, 
and recovered by means of full reconfiguration. A golden configuration memory 
is not needed for SEU/MBU mitigation, but it is for SEFI recovery. 
With the proposed scrubber the system redundancy (and reliability by extend) 
may vary over time. From initial T M R mode, persistent errors will lead the 
system to a DMR mode with reduced reliability. In DMR mode, golden memory 
is required for SEU/MBU mitigation. In addition, the scrub rate can also adapt 
to dynamic radiation environment. The scrubber concept has been validated with 
a simulation model for the F P G A Configuration Layer from a previous work, and 
some simulation results have been presented. The scrubber performance during 
readback and scrub cycles are in line with expectations. 
As future work it is foreseen to prototype the scrubber in hardware. This will 
allow to characterize scrubber performance and power consumption in different 
redundancy and scrub rate configurations. Hardware-based fault injection via 
SelectMAP is planned for these experiments, and convergence with simulation-
based results will also be analyzed. Future work is also planned to develop strate-
gies for inter-operation of scrubber and voter modules, as well as for user da ta 
recovery after a full F P G A reconfiguration. 
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